Introduction
A popular government without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own Governors must arm themselves with the Power that knowledge gives.
-James Madison. 1 Most of the American public is largely ignorant of politics. Much evidence suggests that political ignorance is often great indeed.
The biggest issue in the 2010 congressional election was the economy. Yet two-thirds of the public did not realize that that the economy had grown rather than shrunk during the previous year. 2 In the aftermath of that election, the majority of Americans did not realize that the Republican Party had taken control of the House of Representatives, but not the Senate. The existence of such ignorance does not by itself prove that there is anything wrong with our political system. Perhaps these polls are somehow unrepresentative. In any case, maybe voters do not need much in the way of knowledge. Perhaps they can make good decisions even if they know very little. Still, these examples and others like them are at least cause for concern.
If the public really is often ignorant, we might have a serious problem on our hands.
Why Political Ignorance Matters
Democracy is rule by the people. The literal meaning of the original Greek word "democracy" signifies exactly that: rule by the demos, the Greek word for the common people.
The day to day business of government may be conducted by elected officials. But those leaders are ultimately responsible to the public. If they fail to serve the interests of the voters, they can be replaced at the next election by others who will do better. In this way, the democratic process is people, for the people." 8 The key to the entire scheme is the accountability of elected officials to voters.
Some value democratic control of government for its own sake. 9 Others do so for primarily instrumental reasons. 10 Either way, accountability is a crucial part of the picture. But effective democratic accountability requires voters to have at least some political knowledge.
Voters cannot hold government officials accountable for their actions if they do not know what the government is doing. And they cannot know which candidates" proposals will serve the public better unless they have at least some understanding of those policies and their likely effects.
Accountability is also difficult to achieve if voters do not know which officials are responsible for which issues. If the public schools perform poorly, should the voter blame the local government, the state government, the federal government, or all three? Which officials, if any, can be blamed for economic recessions? Are mistakes in the conduct of the War on Terror the responsibility of the president alone, or does Congress deserve a share of the blame?
Answering these questions and others like them requires at least some degree of political knowledge. Democratic accountability is unlikely to be effective if voters don"t know what their government is doing, don"t understand its effects, or don"t know which government officials to
hold responsible for what issues.
Even if an individual voter does not care about political accountability or does not mind if her government performs poorly, he may still have a responsibility to become informed for the sake of his fellow citizens. After all, the winners of the next election will govern not only him but everyone else who lives in his society. Casting a ballot is not a purely individual choice that affects no one but the voter. In the admittedly highly unlikely event that it influences the outcome of an election, it will also affect the lives of thousands or millions of other people. Even the citizen who is personally uninterested in the quality of public policy may justifiably feel a moral obligation to become informed if he intends to vote.
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Obviously, it is not enough to conclude that voters need to have at least some political knowledge to make democracy work. We also need to know how much knowledge is enough. If it turns out that voters know too little, it would be useful to know why. Even more important, we
need to know what if anything can be done to alleviate the harm caused by excessive political ignorance.
These questions are the focus of this book. I doubt that I or anyone else can answer them definitively. It would be arrogant to assume that any one book can settle issues that have been debated for over two thousand years. But I hope to make a useful contribution to the discussion.
The first half of the book analyzes the nature and extent of the problem of political ignorance in American democracy. The evidence shows that political ignorance is extensive and poses a very serious challenge to democratic theory. The severity of the problem is exacerbated by the reality that, for most citizens, political ignorance is not the result of stupidity or selfishness. Rather, ignorance turns out to be rational behavior -even for many who are far from stupid and are genuinely concerned about the welfare of the nation as well as their own. The insignificance of any one vote to electoral outcomes makes it rational for most citizens to devote 11 See Jason Brennan, There is a second reason why it is not a paternalistic infringement on voter freedom to worry about political ignorance and advocate measures to reduce its impact. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, widespread ignorance about politics is in large part the result of a collective action
problem. An individual voter has little incentive to learn about politics because there is only an infinitesimal chance that his or her well-informed vote will actually affect electoral outcomes.
Political ignorance is therefore an example of rational individual behavior that leads to potentially dangerous collective outcomes.
Economists have long recognized that outside intervention may be needed to address such "public goods" problems. 15 Such intervention is not necessarily paternalistic because it may actually be giving the people that which they want but lack the incentive to produce for themselves through uncoordinated individual action.
In the same way, it is not necessarily paternalistic to advocate the restriction of air pollution. Individual citizens and firms may produce more air pollution than any of them actually want because they know that there is little to be gained from uncoordinated individual restraint. If I as an individual avoid driving a gas-guzzling car, the impact on the overall level of air pollution will be utterly insignificant. So I have no incentive to take it into account in making my driving decisions even if I care greatly about reducing air pollution. Widespread public ignorance is a type of pollution that infects the political system rather than our physical environment.
Finally, even if voters do have the right to select whatever policies they please regardless of their effect on fellow citizens, ignorance might still be problematic. After all, a person making a choice based on ignorance might well fail to achieve his intended result. If I buy a dilapidated car based on the erroneous belief that it is in good condition, my purposes in purchasing in are likely to be frustrated if it quickly breaks down. 16 Similarly, voters who support protectionist policies in the erroneous expectation that they will benefit the economy as a whole rather than weaken it will also end up undermining their own goals. 17 Voters may not be able to effectively exercise their right to choose the policies they wish if their choices are based on ignorance.
Political ignorance might be unimportant if public opinion had little or no effect on policy.
In that event, voters would not actually be exercising any genuine "power over others" after all.
However, a large literature shows that public opinion does have a significant impact on at least the broad outlines of policy. 18 Public opinion is, of course, far from the only influence on policymaking. As will be discussed later in this book, 19 Even if public opinion did not influence policy in the status quo, most major normative theories of democracy assume that it should do so, at least to some substantial extent. As explained in Chapter 2, these theories also imply knowledge prerequisites that voters must meet in order to exercise that influence effectively.
The Historic Debate over Political Ignorance
The problem of political ignorance is not a new one. Political philosophers have debated the implications of voter ignorance for democracy since that system of government first originated in ancient Greece, in the city state of Athens. Early critics of Athenian democracy argued that Athens was doomed to failure because its policies were set by ignorant common citizens. 22 In The Gorgias, the great philosopher Plato contended that democracy is defective because it adopts policies based on the views of the ignorant masses and neglected the better- 
Defining Political Knowledge
Before analyzing political ignorance, it is important to define what we mean by political knowledge. Throughout this book, I focus primarily on political knowledge defined as knowledge of factual matters related to politics and public policy. These include knowledge of specific policy issues and leaders. As we shall see more fully in Chapter 1, many voters are unaware of the elements of important public policies enacted by the legislature. Factual political knowledge also includes knowledge of broad structural elements of government, such as which public officials are responsible for which issues; and the elements of competing political ideologies, such as liberalism and conservatism. For example, the majority of citizens do not know which branch of government has the power to declare war.
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It is also important to consider the extent to which voters are unable to rationally evaluate the information they do have. By "rationally," I mean only whether they evaluate the information in a logically consistent, unbiased manner, not whether they reach morally defensible conclusions about public policy. For example, if a voter wants to increase economic growth and she is shown evidence that free trade is likely to promote that goal, her support for protectionism should diminish. However, she could rationally ignore this evidence if she does not value economic growth and instead prefers to maximize the incomes of protected domestic industries, regardless of the impact on the overall economy or the effects on foreigners. 36 As will be explained in Chapter 5, many early 20th century white southern voters favored policies oppressing blacks in part because they believed that AfricanAmericans had inherent criminal tendencies and were likely to rape white women unless they could be cowed by the threat of lynching. These false factual beliefs were not the only cause of racism, but they surely contributed.
Voting and Values
Disagreements over some issues, such as abortion, 37 may be largely determined by conflicting fundamental values, with little role for factual information. On a vast range of major political issues, however, differences between opposing parties and ideologies turn primarily on disagreements over how to achieve widely agreed upon goals, such as economic prosperity, crime reduction, environmental protection, and security against the threat of attack by terrorists 36 A May 2007 Gallup poll found that 35% of Americans believe that homosexuality is caused by "upbringing and environment" with 42% answering (correctly) that it is a condition "a person is born with." People giving the former answer were far more likely to believe that homosexuality is morally unacceptable and that homosexual sex should be against the law. 78 percent of the latter believe that homosexuality is "an acceptable alternative lifestyle," compared with only 30% of the former. and foreign powers. 38 These objectives are widely shared in American society by people across the political spectrum, and are considered to be the most important goals of public policy by large majorities of the public. 39 Even on those issues where political conflict focuses primarily on differences in fundamental values, factual knowledge is often still relevant. For example, a voter whose values lead him to support efforts to ban abortion may still need to know whether the government is actually capable of eliminating most abortions, and at what cost. 40 The vast majority of the examples of ignorance considered in this book relate to issues where political debate focuses on competing means of achieving shared values, rather than ones where political disagreements are more likely to be purely the product of differences over fundamental values.
Factual knowledge is not the only kind of information relevant to political decisions. But it is often among the most important.
A more fundamental values-based rejection of the idea that political ignorance matters is the claim that it is somehow illegitimate to evaluate the moral decisions of democracies by standards external to the values of the voters. For example, political theorist Ian Shapiro rejects the idea of "some "birds-eye" standpoint, existing previously to and independently of democratic procedures, by reference to which we can evaluate the outcomes they produce." . 40 According to some estimates, up to one million women per year sought to obtain black market abortions before the Supreme Court forced the nation-wide legalization of abortions in 1973. Tribe, Abortion, 140. Many pro-lifers might still support banning abortion even if aware of this problem, though others perhaps might not. But the existence of a massive black market is surely relevant to determinations of what sorts of pro-life policies should be adopted, even from the standpoint of those whose values condemn abortion as immoral. 41 Ian Shapiro, Democracy's Place, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 9. He partially qualifies this by adding that democracy must be defended on "consequentialist grounds," which implies that there might be external standards for evaluating its output after all. But he then undermines the qualification by suggesting that only democratic procedures can determine what policies to adopt in situations where "the desirability of the consequences in question is debatable," which presumably includes virtually all political issues on which people are likely to Even if it is illegitimate to second-guess the values voters bring to the democratic process, it is not clear why it is wrong to point out that inadequate political knowledge might prevent them from realizing those values as fully and effectively as they otherwise might. Such an argument does not challenge the voters" goals, but merely points out that they sometimes lack the means to effectively achieve them through the democratic process. To put it in Shapiro"s terms, this approach does not adopt "a "birds-eye" standpoint" on the democratic process, but rather judges its output by the standards of the voters" own values and goals.
Yet there is no inherent reason to limit criticism of democratic decisions to the choice of means alone. Unless we become complete moral relativists, we must admit the possibility that voters might sometimes base their decisions on flawed or unjust values such as racism, sexism, or anti-Semitism.
If we do choose to be absolute moral relativists, then we indeed lack grounds for criticizing democratic decisions. But we also lack any basis for claiming that democracy is superior to other forms of government, such as monarchy, oligarchy, or a totalitarian state. 42 If no values are better than others, then there is no reason to believe that the values promoted by liberal democracy are any better than those promoted by the regimes of Hitler or Stalin. We could no more judge autocratic regimes from an external "birds-eye standpoint" than we can democracies. greater happiness, or greater equality, it is also possible that one type of democratic government may be preferable to another for the exact same reasons.
This book does not present a theory of the ideal set of criteria by which political regimes should be judged. But it does assume that some regimes can reasonably be considered better than others.
Plan of the Book
The next four chapters of this book outline the scope and nature of the problem of political ignorance in American democracy. Chapters 5 to 7 consider various possible solutions.
Some of these are proposals for increasing voter knowledge, while others are institutional adjustments that would reduce the risks posed by a given level of ignorance. I conclude that the problem of political ignorance is a very serious one, and that there is unlikely to be a quick or easy solution. But its effects can to an important degree be mitigated through limiting the size, complexity, and centralization of government.
Chapter 1 summarizes the evidence of widespread political ignorance in the United States.
While much of this data will not surprise experts in the field, it is still important to recognize the full scope of ignorance and its remarkable persistence over time. Chapter 2 compares actual levels of voter knowledge to the requirements of several prominent normative theories of political participation. It is not a great surprise that knowledge levels fall short of the requirements of demanding theories, such as "deliberative democracy." But they also fall short of the much more minimal requirements of other theories generally considered to be more realistic. The failure of voters to meet the demands of even relatively modest theories of political participation highlights the severity of the challenge of political ignorance for democratic theory.
In Chapter 3, I explain why political ignorance is actually rational behavior for most citizens. The core argument is a familiar one to students of political knowledge. Anthony Downs first showed that political ignorance is generally rational in a famous 1957 book. 43 Voters have little incentive to become informed because there is only an infinitesimal chance that any one vote will affect the outcome of an election. This explains why so many remain ignorant about basic political issues even in a world where information is readily available through the media and other sources. The main constraint on political learning is not the availability of information, but the willingness of voters to take the time and effort needed to learn and understand it.
Chapter 3 also considers the connections between rational ignorance and economist Bryan
Caplan"s theory of "rational irrationality," which holds that voters not only have incentives to be ignorant, but also to engage in highly biased evaluation of the information they do have. 44 The combination of rational ignorance and rational irrationality is a more serious danger than either taken alone. Among other problems, the combination of the two makes voters far more susceptible to misinformation and deception than they would be otherwise.
In Chapter 4, we review claims that voter ignorance might be offset by the use of "information shortcuts" that enable voters to cast well-informed ballots despite knowing little or no factual information. Some of these shortcuts have genuine value in enabling poorly informed voters to make better choices. Overall, however, they fall far short of fully offsetting the dangers posed by ignorance. Moreover, some shortcuts actually lead to worse decisions, because they may actively mislead rationally ignorant voters.
Chapter 5 compares the informational incentives of "voting with your feet" to those of conventional ballot box voting. Unlike ballot box voting, such "foot voting" creates much better incentives to both acquire information and use it rationally. The reason is simple: for most foot voters, the choice to leave or stay is individually decisive. The would-be migrant does not have to take a vote in which her ballot has only a miniscule chance of making a difference. Rather, she knows that whatever decision she makes she can then implement, subject perhaps to the agreement of a few family members. This simple point has important implications for institutional design in democratic political systems. It strengthens the case for decentralizing political power. The greater the degree of decentralization, the more political decisions can be made by foot voting, rather than ballot box voting alone.
The informational advantages of foot voting also buttress the case for limiting the scope of government authority relative to the private sector. In markets and civil society, individuals can often vote with their feet even more effectively than in a system of decentralized federalism.
Foot voting in the private sector usually doesn"t carry as high moving costs as interjurisdictional migration. In addition, limiting the scope of government could alleviate information problems by reducing the knowledge burden imposed on voters. The smaller and less complex government is, the more likely that even rationally ignorant voters might be able to understand its functions.
Chapter 6 considers the implications of political ignorance for the longstanding debate Finally, Chapter 7 explores some of the best-known proposals for increasing the political knowledge of the electorate. These include limits on the franchise, improved civic education, changing media coverage of politics, delegating greater authority to experts, and proposals for requiring citizens to engage in greater deliberation. Some of these ideas have potential. But many run afoul of the reality that, in a world of rational ignorance, the major constraint on political ignorance is not the supply of information but the demand for it. Even if information is readily available, voters may be unwilling to take the time to learn it.
Proposals to increase political knowledge will also be difficult to implement effectively given real-world political constraints. The very political ignorance and irrationality that necessitates their consideration is a key obstacle to their enactment in a form likely to work. Any reform proposal would have to be enacted by a democratic process that is itself heavily influenced by ignorance. Moreover, it may be almost impossible to increase political knowledge enough to enable voters to cope effectively with more than a fraction of the many complex issues controlled by the modern state.
some time to come, if ever. We must, therefore, find better ways to live with widespread political ignorance.
This book does not provide a complete analysis of the appropriate, size, scope and organization of government. Political ignorance is far from the only factor that must be taken account of in any such theory. But it deserves a much greater role in the discussion than it has gotten so far.
